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Lajos Thallóczy, this late theoretic of Hungarian foreign policy entered into 
the political life in 1886, when he began to work as a secretary of Benjámin Kál-
lay, who was then Austria-Hungary’s minister of finance and governor of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. This experience determined his political views. In 1908 he be-
came head of department at Austria-Hungary’s Joint Ministry of Finance; during 
the Balkan Wars he was promoted Real Internal Privy Counselor. Shortly there-
after Thallóczy entered the department of 3rd rank – the highest official level for 
a civil servant in the Monarchy. In 1915–16, he was the civil counselor of the 
military administration in occupied Serbia.1 
Although he was a civil servant of the joint ministries, he tried to promote 
the foreign political interests of a Hungarian pressure group represented by Count 
István Tisza, Prime Minister from 1913 and Baron István Burián, Joint Minister 
of Finance 1903–1912.2 He was clever enough to remain in shade and influence 
politics behind the scene. As a disciplined historian and well-known albanologist 
he has unchallenged merits in creating the independent Albania.3 He wrote the 
first concise Albanian history (also used by pupils!) translated by his agent, Zef 
Zurani to Albanian. He was the first western scholar, who tried to create the myth 
of Skanderbeg as an anti-Turkish Christian hero (after the attempt of Albanian 
Pashko Vasa in 1879)4, serving as an instrument for the unification of the Albanian 
nation. The idea to create a nation based on common language, thus diminishing 
the role of religious differences and in this way diverging Albanians from the 
Ottomans was also his initiative. Geographer-adventurers with good local con-
nections, like Baron Ferenc Nopcsa5 who collected information about the internal 
situation in Albania were among his students.6 He also had field experience: when 
the soldiers and civil servants of Austria-Hungary were sent on holiday, their task 
was regularly to collect as many data as possible. In the summer of 1913 his task 
was to describe Albanian internal situation7: in order to avoid any suspect, he trav-
elled through Russia (where he collected statistical data on Lódz and other Polish 
industrial cities)8, was shipped in Constantinople, passed around Greece with his 
agents to reach his final destination. His mission was so confidential, that he did 
not put down the achievements in his diary, which is – compared to other talkative 
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parts – a rare occasion. The above mentioned Zurani contributed to smuggling 
weapons into Albania with the knowledge of Austrian authorities. Thus beyond 
the scientific circle an unofficial ’secret service’ was working around him.9 His 
talent was also appreciated by Rappaport and Ippen, official delegates of Austria-
Hungary in London sent for the delimitation of Albania.10 It was Thallóczy indeed 
who offered proposals for Albanian borders and for possible territorial conces-
sions given to its neighbours.11
The ’triumvirate’ of Tisza, Burián and Thallóczy was following the concept 
of Andrássy and Kállay. As an albanologist, Thallóczy had a crucial role in cre-
ating a political program for this lobby: while the Austrian war-party of Conrad 
was focusing on the destruction of Serbia and Italy, the Hungarian group wanted 
to shift the sphere of influence of Austria-Hungary from the Morava-Vardar axis 
to the Albanian coast. Owing to the strong Russian support, this group refrained 
from the integration of Serbia into the economic sphere of Austria-Hungary, thus 
reaching Saloniki (anyway the incorporation or annihillation of Serbia would have 
meant trialism, that the Hungarian elite feared more, than a war with Russia). 
They thought that the creation of Albania and its connection to the Bosnian rail-
ways might also secure Austro-Hungarian economic outlet and in that case Italy 
would be unable to close down the Otranto Strait. The creation of Albania became 
of primary importance during the Balkan Wars, that is why Austria-Hungary in-
sisted on Serbia leaving the coast. As a recompensation Macedonia was offered, 
because the exacerbation of Bulgarian-Serbian antagonism was also another in-
strument which was utilized by this grouThey even wanted to substitute or check 
the reluctant Romania with a Bulgarian-Austrian cooperation.12 Nevertheless the 
competition between the different pressure groups decreased the efficiency of 
Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy in 1912–1913.
Thallóczy’s diary is of primary importance for the examination of the diplo-
macy of the Dual Monarchy, because he was present not only at the official assem-
blies of the delegates, but was also invited to informal meetings where most of the 
brainstorming took place. Through his friends he was able to collect information 
about many rumours, personal interests and even antagonisms that formed the of-
ficial policy of Austria-Hungary behind the curtains. In this sense his diaries pro-
vide us much more, that can be reconstructed from officially published documents 
like the “Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik”. Nevertheless, as being the member 
of a political pressure group that temporarily lost ist influence in 1912–1913, he 
could not remain impartial when writing his accounts and giving an analysis of 
decisions made. 
Contrary to Burián, who wrote his diary to himself in order to explain and 
confirm his thoughts and deeds, and definitely not to the broad publicity, Thallóc-
zy decided to write his memoirs as a publicist. Being disappointed from the in-
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ternal and external political failures of Austria-Hungary, he dared criticize his op-
ponents and political comrats in a sharp tone, although he knew it well, that his 
documents (after deciphered by his secretary János Peregrényi) would be used by 
the forthcoming generation as a valuable document of that era. His writing is full 
of anecdotes, stories alternating with strict facts and numbers. This uneasy per-
sonality was a ’real Hungarian’ regarding his psychical features – he wrote very 
pessimistically.13 Reading his detailed accounts one may come to the conclusion 
that the collapse of the overbureaucratized and Austria-Hungary was necessary 
and inevitable.
*
When Berchtold became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1912 after the 
sudden death of Aehrenthal, it also meant that the the political influence of Hun-
garians lost ground and they were pulled out from decision-making (none of the 
three joint ministers represented Hungarian goals then). The growing conceptual 
and personal difference between the Hungarian pressure group and Berchtold soon 
became evident. Berchtold criticized Aehrenthal’s policy regarding the annexation 
and the railway-question, claiming that these adventures had ruined the prestige of 
and trust toward Austria-Hungary14, and Aehrenthal was usually influenced by the 
concept of Burián, that time Joint Minister of Finance and Governor of Bosnia.15 
After the death of the previous – in a very critical period –, and the dismissal of the 
latter (he was substituted by the Polish Bilinski)16 nobody represented Hungarian 
interests at the highest levels. When finally the third from the ’triumvirate’, Count 
Tisza became Prime Minister of Hungary in 1913, he was suffering from lack of 
information in foreign political questions. Although he had a clear concept to win 
Bulgaria as an ally in return for the loss of Romania, he had definitely no instru-
ments to realize this, until Burián was appointed as a Mediating Minister between 
Francis Joseph and the Hungarian government. In this way direct influence on 
decision-makers was restored.
For Thallóczy it seemed that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs had no clear 
concept on what to do in case of the probable collapse of Turkey – he was only 
good at criticizing his predecessor. In his opinion Berchtold lacked strong will 
and was to pursuit a reactive and not a proactive-preventive foreign policy. This 
annoyed Thallóczy’s circles.17 Berchtold’s idea was simple according to the mali-
cious Hungarian: he wanted to put as many soldiers as possible along the border, 
but for this he needed money.18 Unfortunately he did not recognise that question of 
military power is determined partly by the calamities of Hungarian internal affairs. 
The first rumours about the Balkan League reached Thallóczy on 19 Septem-
ber. Austrian diplomats were erroneously convinced that it was an anti-Turkish 
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alliance created by Charikov19, and they did not know anything at all about its 
existing anti-Austrian character. Thallóczy admitted on 1st October that the Bal-
kan states tricked not only Austria-Hungary, but Russia, the creator of the Balkan 
Alliance too.20 Although the occupation of Belgrade immediately arose in certain 
Viennese circles to halt the evolution of events, Thallóczy and his comrats thought 
that it would mean a war with Russia, therefore refrained from preventive meas-
ures. They were convinced that after the Balkan war the showdown between the 
two great alliance systems would come next. The fear from Russia and the war 
mesmerized the Austrian diplomacy.21 Thallóczy recognized that Berchtold was 
unable to endure the burden: neither he wanted to undertake the responsibility for 
initiating a war, nor to be labelled as the one who did nothing at all. Berchtold is 
a great lord but a weak hand – summarized Thallóczy his conversation with the 
foreign minister. Although the soldiers were not zealous for the occupation of 
Novpazar calling it a foxtrap, Thallóczy warned, that linking Novipazar to the 
Bosnian railways (which were just under negotiation) would be advantageous in 
the future either to enhance connections with Albanian lands or to promote the 
way to Saloniki bypassing Serbia.22 
Thallóczy realized quite early, that Turkey became on the brink of collapse 
by November, 191223 and this required the reorientation of Berchtold’s foreign 
policy that did not calculated with the Turkish defeat.24 He did not believe that 
the localization plans of the Powers and their insist on status quo would work 
at all, because Bulgaria would never accept this after a victorious war, powers 
could only block the sea and not the inland, and an unilateral Austrian action only 
would be possible against Serbia, which Russia would never tolerate.25 Thallóczy 
remained sceptic arguing that the concert of Powers had never worked and it only 
resulted territorial losses for Turkey. (7-8 October, 1912).26 Having free access to 
secret military reports Thallóczy gives a typical example for the demoralization of 
Ottoman troops. The unpaid Moslem soldiers of Plevlje sold more than 25 thou-
sand weapons to the Montenegrins, non-believers and future enemy just before the 
outbreak of hostilities, as the witnesses from the starving Turkish troops number-
ing 1300 men retreated to Bosnia early in November, 1912 accounted.27 
Berchtold admitted, that the satus quo could not be maintained any more, 
but he was still unable to give a clear concept. Thallóczy wrote sarcastically, that 
Austria-Hungary was the first one giving up the status quo unofficially, but the last 
one which accepted it officially.28 We cannot bind ourselves to a cadaver – wrote 
Thallóczy – Austria lost a defense line by the collapse of Turkey, the southern 
borders became more vulnerable, since the new combinations are always more 
dangerous than old ones.29 
During the days of brainstorming among many ideas the question of the oc-
cupation of Albania arose to secure Austrian interests opposed to the Serbian ad-
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vance to the Adriatic.30 A possible Albanian and Montegrin union was refused by 
Thallóczy, such as giving Scutari to Montenegro.31 Rappaport warned that cutting 
all connections between Ottomans and Albania might anger Moslem Albanians, 
therefore instead of independence the autonomy of Albania was proposed. The 
Germans warned that giving back the Sanjak of Novipazar was a mistake, be-
cause it made impossible to reach Albania through Bosnia.32 Everybody was say-
ing what had to be done instead of telling what is to be done now in the Foreign 
Ministry – wrote Thallóczy, although he admitted that the Germans were right.33 
Another interesting episode regarding the Albanian question and the shortage 
of qualified and capable decision-makers was also mentioned by Thallóczy in May 
1913. He criticized sharply the idea that the consuls of the 6 powers were planned 
to be the head of the controlling committe in Albania, because it would only re-
sulted in rivalry and indecision.34 Neither Rappaport nor Ippen had idea how to 
create a temporary government in Albania with real executive power, without in-
fluence and lacking basic institutions. Thallóczy offered to keep the government 
in Valona, expanded and supervised by the delegates of the Powers.35 He claimed, 
that Ippen had no elaborate plan, he was just an executer of decision-makers, who 
also did not have a clear insight of the events. Berchtold finally called Thallóczy 
in to ask for his proposals. Somebody advised Berchtold to search for a Catholic 
ruler for Albania and not a Protestant, arguing that Moslems prefer faithful believ-
ers, than heretics. Thallóczy warned Berchtold, that most of the Albanian Mos-
lems were bektaşi, which almost equaled with ’free masonry and heresy’ accord-
ing to an eager Muslim.36 Northern Albanians are Catholics only on paper, they 
are very far away from real confession. A catholic ruler would mean nothing for 
these tribal people who would only listen to the local priests, but could exacerbate 
religious differences suppressed up to now. Middle Albanians are rather patriots 
than Moslems, but each wanted to be the leader of the country, while orthodox 
southern Albanians could become Serbs or Greeks easily depending on who pays 
more. Berchtold was astonished by the account of Thallóczy, who also warned 
that the positions of Wied were very weak, he would be expelled from the coun-
try according to his informations. Thallóczy pointed out ironically that a woman 
would be the best solution, because Albanians would not harm her according to 
their traditions. Berchtold complained that Ippen wanted to work on international 
basis that hindered the promotion of Austrian interests, while Thallóczy replied, 
that Ippen just told him the opposite. Berchtold was surprised and finally turned 
out, that nobody gave him proper information about what was going on at lower 
levels (31 May, 1913).
The above mentioned episodes prove that diplomats were embarrassed in-
deed – it was rumoured that the heir apparent wanted war with the Serbs, but peace 
with the Russians, which seemed to be an impossible combination. If Serbian 
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presence at the Adriatic led to war it would attract the intervention of Russia lead-
ing to the escalation of the conflict (7 November 1912).37 The Serbian victory even 
contributed to the settling of the long disputed railway question in Bosnia and 
mitigating the debate between the Austrian and Hungarian party that both wanted 
to secure the iron-mines themselves.38
Contrary to the opinion of the Ballhausplatz, Count Tisza did not consider 
the results of the Balkan War dangerous for Austria-Hungary, indeed he thought 
it was quite useful, because it ended a stalemate and made the realization of the 
plans regarding Albania possible. From economic aspects the leading Hungarian 
geographer, Lajos Lóczy also saw the collapse of Turkey advantageous, because 
as he pointed out, Hungary needed more raw material for its industry, and while 
the Bosnian iron ore was enough for 80 years, Hungary needed more coal (18–20, 
November, 1912).39 Lóczy thought that obtaining economic concessions on the 
ruins of Ottoman Turkey would become easier. But anyway, most of the Hun-
garians lost their belief in the future partly because of the war, partly because of 
the critical internal political situation. The public opinion became very pessimis-
tic, since the spiritless hesitation of the diplomats influenced the public opinion 
through the press.40 Conrad claimed that the hesitative policy of Berchtold would 
ruin the moral of the army.41 The financial agony even worsened the situation. The 
mobilization in Bosnia cost 240 thousand francs daily with no result, except the 
loss of prestige, internal and international trust. The constant governmental crisis 
made Hungary ridiculous.42 The Tatars are eating up each other – wrote Thallóczy 
about the Hungarian elite.43 The dilettantism and the lack of cooperation among 
high-rank officials angered the publicity further: the joint minister of War, Auffen-
berg, increased the number of soldiers contrary to the will of Berchtold, and he 
was soon dismissed.44 Even the bankers began to think that a war would profit 
more, than a peace like this45: the mobilization of the forces cost altogether 1 bil-
lion francs for Austria-Hungary in the two Balkan Wars without any materialized 
result, while the whole budget of the state reached 6 billion.46 This amount almost 
equaled with that of Bulgaria, which fought two wars! The German ambassador, 
Tschirschky pointed out on 9, November 1912, that Germany is ready to march 
with Austria-Hungary, but the leader diplomats were still saying what they do not 
want, instead of telling what they want.47 The country was so powerless and apa-
thic, that an energetic conqueror could take over power easily, like it happened to 
Turkey – wrote Thallóczy.48 
The group of Conrad and Krobatin wanted war against Serbia, partly to re-
store prestige, partly because the moral of the army declined quickly, but Ber-
chtold resisted according to Thallóczy “since no Power in Europe wanted war 
and plundering a carcass is not a honor”. The soldiers finally in November, 1912 
decided themselves to occupy the Sanjak of Novipazar in order to create a com-
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mon border with Albania. But Thallóczy told, that it was then too late, because 
the negotiations for the armistice between the fighting parties seemed to be suc-
cessful: such a decision should have been made earlier.49 Francis Joseph pointed 
out that if the Serbs did not withdraw from Durazzo, that would mean war, but 
Austria-Hungary did not want to initiate preventive war without any Serbian insult 
that could serve as a good reason.50 A good occasion occured for the showdown, 
when the Serbian troops insulted Prohaska, consul of Austria-Hungary. Thallóczy 
mentioned, that the Russian Tzar had written a letter to Francis Joseph, in which 
he pointed out that such an insult would require a revenge and in that case Rus-
sia would not intervene.51 According to Thallóczy this was the moment when the 
bombardment of Belgrade would not have caused a diplomatic incident. But after 
this, without serious reasons an intimidation of Serbs would have been equal with 
an aggression – analysed the situation Krobatin, the new joint minister of War. 
Since most of the high-ranked military officers wanted trialism,52 Thallóczy, who 
represented Hungarian interests, deeply despised them. 
The war and peace parties were still unable to reach an agreement on foreign 
political questions. When the Turks wanted to smuggle 30 thousand weapons to 
Albania through Zef Zurani, an agent of Thallóczy, the authorities of Austria-
Hungary were hesitating to forward them because they received contradictorious 
orders from the two parties, however this amount of weapons would have kept off 
Montenegrins from Scutari and would have promoted the Albanian position of 
Austria-Hungary.53 The same situation – even more ridiculous – took place, when 
Hasan Prishtina managed to escape from his Serbian prison in Belgrade, but the 
Hungarian authorities denied him to enter the country without papers – however 
he could have mobilized Albanians in Kosova thus creating difficulties for the 
Serbs.
Finally Austria-Hungary decided to declare her demands against Serbia 
which have been never realized: (1) official renouncement from Bosnia, (2) full-
scale prohibition of the activity of the Narodna Odbrana, (3) recompensation of 
Austria-Hungary in the sanjak of Novipazar (Plevlje, Priepolje), (4) joint shipping 
on river Drina, (5) the acquisition of Mt. Lovčen from Montenegro, (6) building 
of Užice-Vardište line by Serbia that connects Bosnia with Serbia, creating a link 
towards river Morava, (7) free trade till 1917, then customs union with Serbia and 
Montenegro, (8) the creation of a Sarajevo-Mitrovica-Saloniki railroad by Aus-
trian entrepreneurs within 6 years without Serbian objection.54 This proposal was 
elaborated by Bilinski, Joint Minister of Finance, chief of Thallóczy, who wanted 
to push Berchtold toward a more active foreign policy, like Burián did the same, 
when Aehrenthal was in charge. But Berchtold resisted to execute the plan.
Thallóczy clearly recognised the problem of the Romanian compensation 
and the hesitation of the Bulgarians early in 1913 – he claimed that the Romanians 
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would penetrate into Bulgaria, if they lost their patience (nevertheless they would 
not have tried it without Russian encouragement contrary to Thallóczy’s belief)55. 
He also recognised that Greece and Serbia would be a natural enemy of Bulgaria, 
therefore if the Serbs refused the Austrian demands, Austria-Hungary should pro-
mote the interests of Bulgaria56, as it would be also a good instrument to balance 
Russian influence over peninsula. This was the concept of the Hungarian pressure 
group of Tisza, Burián and Thallóczy, which also wanted to check Romania – 
that showed russophile tendencies, since Russians promised them Transylvania57 
– with Bulgaria. This raised a serious problem, since the Germans wanted to keep 
the benevolent alliance of Romania (and also tried to convince the Hungarians to 
give southern Transylvania to Romania) and Berchtold started to balance between 
the two concepts. Tarnowski, ambassador in Sofia added further, that the Bulgar-
ians would be the natural enemies of Serbia, even if their dreams about Mac-
edonia remained unfulfilled, therefore the realization of Greater Bulgaria is not 
essential.58 So, Austria-Hungary offered Serbia to obtain Macedonian territories 
as compensation for their withdrawal from the Adriatic. That’s also one reason for 
the weak Austrian support of Bulgarian claims during the negotiations of the Bu-
charest Peace Treaty, the second one is, that Romania was backed both by Russia 
and Germany, and the latter did not take into consideration Hungarian interests. 
It was Germany indeed – claimed Thallóczy – that gave free hand to Romania59, 
while Bulgaria was reluctant to give any concessions – although Berchtold had 
been convincing them for 8 weeks – thus thwarting the policy of Austria-Hungary.
The diary contains an important element that puts the Bulgarian attack on 
Serbia during the second Balkan War into a different light. The journalist Richard 
von Mach claimed that Tzar Ferdinand attacked Serbia, because he hoped for an 
Austrian intervention.60 French scholars also wrote, that Austria-Hungary encour-
aged the war in order to dismember Serbia.61 Recent studies seemed to deny this 
theory: Löding in her work mentions 50 million francs financial aid in case of 
war62, but no military aid. But reading Thallóczy’s diary one may come to the 
conclusuion, that the statements in early works are not completely groundless. 
Thallóczy wrote that Austria-Hungary promised the Bulgarians, that in case of a 
Serbo-Bulgarian war Austria would intervene, if the Bulgarians were defeated63, 
and in that case Serbia would be dismembered between Romania, Bulgaria and 
Austria-Hungary.64 Although officially published documents deny the possibility 
of an Austrian military intervention, even if this was an unofficial rumour, it could 
have influenced the behavior of Tzar Ferdinand.65 Thallóczy was quite sceptic 
regarding a Serbo-Bulgarian war66, and he wrote that neither Serbia, nor Bulgaria 
would do such a favour for Austria-Hungary to benefit from this event, anyway, 
neither parties had enough money to fight.67 However, he also added, that for Bal-
kan states money is not essential to fight a war (29 May, 1913).68 
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Furthermore, the above mentioned were repeated on July 4, 1913 after the 
outbreak of hostilities, based on talks with Bilinski: if war broke out and Bul-
garia was defeated and the Romanians crossed the line given to them in Dobruja69, 
Austria-Hungary would intervene and attack Serbia in order to occupy the Sanjak 
of Novibazar creating a common border between Bosnia and Albania.70 However, 
neither Berchtold, nor Francis Joseph was convinced by Bilinski, the above men-
tioned combinations are confirmed in the work of Conrad von Hötzendorf71, and 
also appear in the diary of Baernreither. The latter wrote that Berchtold had told 
these ideas to the German ambassador, Tschirschky72, who usually disinformed 
the Bulgarian ambassador in Vienna, Salabashev.73 Therefore the thesis, that Tzar 
Ferdinand attacked Serbia without any (Austrian) encouragement is flawed, and 
documents put the question of his personal responsibility into a different light.
Приложения
447
HESITATION, INDECISION OR ASTUTENESS? THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY IN 1912–1913 BASED ON THE DIARY OF LAJOS THALLÓCZY 
Thallóczy, IX/1. 500-501.
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Thallóczy, IX/2. 581.
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